In many industries, …rms reward their customers for making referrals. We analyze the optimal policy mix of price, advertising intensity, and a referral fee for monopoly when buyers choose to what extent to refer other consumers to the …rm. We …nd that the …rm advertises less under referrals, but does not change its price from the monopoly level in an attempt to manage consumer referrals. We show that referral programs are Pareto-improving and that the …rm underprovides referrals while supporting the socially optimum level of advertising. We extend the analysis to the case where consumer referrals can be targeted.
Introduction
Firms often pay existing customers for referring potential customers to the …rms'products or services. Such referral programs are advertised as "Win/Win/Win" because existing customers, potential customers, and the …rm can all bene…t from referrals. The recent explosion in consumer-generated media, together with the documented trust consumers have in recommendations of other people, explains why …rms would strive to manage word of mouth. 1 Indeed, as consumer forums, blogs, and other means of consumer interaction are enhanced by advances in technology, the mix of information channels that …rms rely on is changing. Firms are shifting away from mass advertising to more targeted channels that rely on consumers to spread the word about products. Improved online referral systems promise to make it easier for …rms to monitor and control referral activity. How can …rms use these new capabilities in designing their promotional strategies?
The adoption of a referral policy is one way …rms can try to harness the power of word of mouth. A consumer referral policy is a promise by a …rm to reward its customers for referring other people to the …rm. For example, DIRECTV'Referral O¤er promises a $100 credit to any customers for referring a friend who signs up for the company's service. Referral policies are adopted in a variety of industries, including banking, health care, Web design services, home remodeling, housing, vacation packages, home alarm systems, and high-speed Internet connection. They are used in the recruitment of nurses, technicians, and US Army 1 According to Nielsen's 2012 Global Trust in Advertising Survey of 28,000 Internet respondents from 56 countries, consumers around the world continue to …nd recommendations from personal acquaintances by far the most credible: 92 percent of respondents trust ("completely" or "somewhat") recommendations from people they know and 90 percent …nd these recommendations ("highly" or "somewhat") relevant. In comparison, ads are found trustworthy or relevant by 30-50 percent of respondents, depending on the media. personnel, as well as in selling cars, houses, and tickets to sports events. Private schools, doctors, and daycare centers give out referral bonuses as well. 2 In this paper, we explore how referral policies can be set to maximize their potential in generating value for the …rm. The problem of choosing an optimal referral policy is complicated by the fact that a …rm's pricing, advertising, and referral policies interact. In particular, a referral policy cannot be chosen in isolation from other marketing tools because it a¤ects the e¤ectiveness of these other tools and vice versa. The goal of this paper is to …nd the optimal marketing mix while recognizing the interaction between pricing, advertising, and referral strategies. Additionally, we allow consumers to decide on the intensity of their referral activity by weighing referral incentives and the costs of making referrals. To our knowledge, no other study has taken such a comprehensive approach to developing an analytical model of consumer referrals.
We introduce consumer referrals into a monopoly market with advertising. Consumers can become informed about the …rm's product either directly through advertisements or indirectly through consumer referrals. The referral policy provides a monetary reward (referral fee) to consumers who had purchased the product and made a successful referral that led to the referred consumer's purchase of the product. Consumer valuations for the product are i.i.d. random variables drawn from a common distribution, and they are the private information of the consumers. Consumers can make multiple referrals at a common cost, receiving a referral fee for each successful referral. In the benchmark model, we assume that a consumer sends referrals randomly to all other consumers. As a result, in equilibrium there 2 In our analysis, we will focus on the common case of …xed referral fees paid out to existing customers for referring a new customer who buys the product. A casual observation of referral policies suggests that referral payments are usually made in the form of cash, deposit, gift certi…cate, bonus points, free product or service, or entry into a lottery.
is congestion in referral messages. The …rm can manage referral incentives in our model by changing its marketing mix (price, advertising intensity, and referral fee).
In this framework, we answer such questions as: When would a …rm support active consumer referrals? Would it set a higher or lower price under referrals? Would it engage in more or less advertising under referrals? What are the overall welfare e¤ects of referral policies? We show that the …rm chooses to rely on an active referral policy as long as the cost to consumers of making referrals is not too high. We …nd that the …rm advertises less under referrals and uses referral fees to manage referral activity, keeping the price at the monopoly level. Importantly, when the …rm chooses to support active consumer referrals, it bene…ts all consumers as well (in the ex ante sense), con…rming the potential "Win/Win/Win"feature of referral programs.
In this benchmark model, we …rst characterize the consumer referral equilibrium for each combination of the …rm's policy mix (Proposition 1). Then, we characterize the optimal policy mix. We …nd that the pro…t-maximizing price is the standard monopoly price as long as the referral fee is chosen optimally (Proposition 2). This somewhat surprising result follows from the fact that the referral fee is used to control the referral reach, and once the referral fee is chosen optimally it does not generate any distortion in the choice of price.
Another result is that the …rm's advertising intensity is reduced when consumer referrals are introduced (Proposition 3). We also show that the …rm's advertisement level is the same as the social optimum level, while the pro…t-maximizing referral reach is lower than the socially optimal one (Proposition 6).
Although our benchmark model provides several interesting results, the model lacks an important aspect of consumer referrals. One of the major motivations for a …rm to adopt a consumer referral program is consumer information advantage: consumers may have better information than the …rm about other consumers'valuations. If consumer referrals can be targeted, then it could be even more bene…cial for the …rm to use consumers to disseminate information about the product. We show that the main results of the paper extend to the case when consumers know whether other consumers are informed and/or are willing to purchase the product.
We also extend our model by allowing two groups of consumers: High-type and Low-type consumers. High-type consumers tend to have higher valuations than Low-type consumers in the sense of …rst-order stochastic dominance. Firms cannot distinguish between consumer types, but consumers can tell who belongs to their group. In such a case, the monopoly should have stronger incentives to use consumer referrals, especially if the High-type group's valuations tend to be much higher than the Low-type's. It turns out that having two types can complicate the analysis signi…cantly, but if willingness-to-pay distributions are signi…-cantly di¤erent across types, then we can obtain a clear result. We …nd that if only High-type consumers get referrals in the case of targeted referrals, then the monopoly price is higher, the ratio of referral fee to product price is lower, and the advertising level is lower than in case of random referrals (Proposition 8). Intuitively, if consumers have better information, the monopoly relies less on advertising and more on referrals. are rational and forward-looking -they consider the expected bene…t from giving a referral when making their purchase decisions. The authors show that even though the …rm sets a common price and referral fee, it will e¤ectively price-discriminate between consumers located early in the chain (who are more valuable to the monopoly) and those later in the chain due to di¤erences in the consumers'purchase probabilities.
3 Byalogorsky et al. (2005) take the same setup as Jun and Kim (2008) but adopt a behavioral assumption that consumers make referrals whenever they are su¢ ciently delighted, that is, whenever the expected utility from making a purchase and making a referral exceeds a critical level of "consumer delight." They explore whether the …rm would choose to promote referrals by paying referral fees and/or reducing its price. Since consumer delight includes the net value of purchase, the …rm would lower its price to promote more referrals. When consumers are easy to delight, a referral program would not be used because referrals would be made anyway. But, the …rm would use both a positive referral fee and a lower price when consumers are not so easy to delight.
In these papers, consumers are assumed to be able to contact only the next-in-line consumer, ruling out referral congestion. 4 Galeotti and Goyal (2009) consider a more complex network model in which consumers make multiple referrals with no cost, allowing for referral congestion. In their basic model, the monopoly is assumed to send advertisements randomly, and only the receivers of ads can make consumer referrals. They analyze the optimal advertisement policy in this model and show that using consumer referrals would unambiguously increase pro…ts, but an increase in the level of social interaction (described with a network structure) can increase or decrease the advertisement level and pro…ts. They use a reduced form model to concentrate on the relationship between network structure and the optimal strategy of the …rm and its pro…ts.
In contrast, we assume a simple network structure (a complete network) while we analyze the optimal combination of the …rm's strategies: product price, referral fee, and level of advertising.
The second stream of literature focuses on advertising and congestion. In his pioneering paper, Butters (1977) (2013) present alternative information congestion models in which consumers ignore some advertisements they receive. 5 They all show that as the number of ads decreases, both …rms and consumers are better o¤ due to a reduction in congestion, though the mechanisms by which this occurs di¤er. In contrast, in our model, referrals are subject to congestion because we endogenize the referral intensity. Despite the presence of referral congestion, we …nd that referrals are underprovided by the monopoly. This result is due to the non-appropriability of consumer surplus. In the literature with one information channel, the …rm would similarly underprovide informative advertising, e.g. as in Esteban et al. (2001) . show that market segmentation generates higher pro…ts in equilibrium.
All of these papers assume that …rms possess information on consumer types and therefore can conduct targeted advertising. In Section 5 we study related models of targeted referrals. We assume that the …rm has no ability to distinguish between consumer types while consumers have some information on other consumers'types. The …rm uses consumers'superior information to indirectly target consumers by supporting referrals with referral fees.
In equilibrium, consumers who are not in the targeted group for referrals are not likely to be informed about the product, and they are worse o¤ when consumer referrals are used in addition to mass advertising.
In the next section, we take the consumer's perspective and analyze the consumer decision to buy the …rm's product and refer other people. In Section 3, we look at the …rm's choice of price, advertising intensity, and referral fee. Section 4 presents welfare considerations, and Section 5 deals with targeted referrals. We conclude in Section 6. The Appendix contains the more technical proofs.
The Basic Model of Consumer Referrals
In this section, we describe the equilibrium consumer referral behavior in a market served by a monopoly that sets a price, advertises its product, and pays referral bonuses to the existing customers for referring new customers.
There is a large number N of consumers. Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the product. Consumers di¤er only in their willingness to pay, which is assumed to follow a cumulative distribution function G on [0; 1] with a continuous density function g. Let 
be the associated monopoly pro…t.
The …rm's policy is described by a triple (p; a; r): its level of advertisement a 2 [0; 1]
(a fraction of consumers reached by advertisements), its price p 0, and a referral policy characterized by a referral fee r 0. We assume that the …rm cannot price-discriminate between consumers who receive an advertisement and those who are referred to the …rm by other consumers.
Advertisements inform consumers about the …rm's policy. They are distributed to consumers uniformly at random. That is, the probability that a consumer becomes informed through advertising is independent of the consumer's valuation of the product. The number of consumers informed through advertisements ("the informed") is I = aN and the number of consumers who do not receive ads ("the uninformed") is U = (1 a)N . Consumers who become informed through ads buy the product at the stated price or remain inactive. 6 Without receiving an advertisement or referral, a consumer would not know about the product and so cannot purchase it.
After making a purchase, a consumer can attempt to collect referral fees by referring other people. The decision to make referrals is endogenous in the model. A consumer trades o¤ the cost and the expected bene…t of making referrals. Each referral attempt costs c > 0, which captures the cost of informing a contact about the product. On the bene…t side, referral attempts can be successful or unsuccessful. We initially assume that a referrer does not know other people's willingness-to-pay and whether they have been informed through advertisements. If a referrer's contact has a low willingness-to-pay and/or is already informed, the referral attempt will not be successful. Furthermore, potential referrals may have been contacted by others and may choose a di¤erent referring person.
The number of informed consumers who purchase the product and are potential referrers is n = (1 G (p))aN . 7 Referring consumers simultaneously and independently choose referral intensity, i.e. the fraction of consumers to refer. They send referrals at random but without contacting the same person more than once, and referrals sent by di¤erent referrers are independently distributed among all consumers. A consumer choosing an individual referral intensity q 2 [0; 1] contacts qN distinct consumers, but some of these consumers may have received advertisements or may have received multiple referral attempts. 6 Since the monopoly does not price discriminate based on a consumer's information source, waiting to buy by referral can never be better for a consumer than buying immediately. Therefore, we assume that if a consumer receives an advertisement and has a nonnegative bene…t from the product, she purchases it rather than waits for a referral to purchase by referral. Also, in our model, the net expected bene…t of referral in equilibrium is zero, and therefore it does not matter whether consumers know about the referral policy prior to purchase or not. 7 For any referrals to be given in the market, the number of referrers and well as the number of uninformed consumers have to be positive, that is, n = (1 G (p))aN > 0 and U = (1 a)N > 0. This implies that a 2 (0; 1) and 1 G (p) > 0 must hold for any referral activity to be supported in the market.
A consumer referral equilibrium is a strategy pro…le q = (q 1 ; :::; q n ) 2 [0; 1] n such that q i is the best response to q i for all i = 1; :::; n. The equilibrium (overall) referral intensity is described by the total number of referral messages sent by referrers as a fraction of N ,
In the symmetric consumer referral equilibrium, each of n referrers sends referrals to a fraction q of all the consumers, i.e. q i = q for all i = 1; :::; n, and S = nq 0.
We will focus on the symmetric equilibrium. Although there also exist a continuum of asymmetric equilibria, the equilibrium referral intensity is identical in all equilibria.
The referral reach, R, is a fraction of all consumers reached by referrals. When each of n consumers refers a fraction q of all consumers, it is described by R = 1 (1 q) n . We will assume that n is large and therefore we can use an approximation R = R(S) = 1 e S in which referral reach is a function of the (overall) referral intensity S = qn.
with R(S) 2 [0; 1), R(0) = 0, R 0 > 0, R 00 < 0, and lim
As referral intensity increases, an increasingly smaller fraction of referrals is successful.
The level of congestion in referral messages can be measured by a functioñ
which is a ratio of the number of referral messages sent by referrers to the number of referrals registered by consumers. The congestion function has intuitive properties:' (S) 1, 
2 equals zero at S = 0 and is increasing:
In what follows, it is more convenient for us to express referral intensity and the level of congestion as a function of referral reach R:
and
It follows that S 0 (R) =
2 > 0, and congestion as a function of referral reach has the same properties as congestion as a function of referral in-
Proposition 1 demonstrates that there exists a unique symmetric consumer referral equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium referral intensity.
Proposition 1.
Suppose the …rm chooses a marketing mix of price p, advertising intensity a, and referral fee r. Then the equilibrium referral reach R = R (p; a; r) is implicitly de…ned by
for all r above the critical level r 0
, and no referrals are sustained for lower levels of referral fee. For r > r 0 , the equilibrium referral intensity and reach are higher when referral fee r is higher and price p, advertising intensity a, and referral cost c are lower.
We …nd that as long as n is large, the referral reach is independent of n. An interesting feature of the equilibrium is that each referring consumer is indi¤erent between sending and (which in turn is the case because 1 (1 + S) e S is zero at S = 0 and because in equilibrium the bene…t from making referrals is equal to its cost. The bene…t of giving a referral is the referral fee multiplied by the probability that the referral is received by an uninformed consumer willing to buy the product, b = (1 a)(1 G (p))r. In equilibrium, the bene…t equals the cost of reaching a consumer with a referral message, c'(R ), which depends on the level of referral congestion (the number of referral attempts required to reach an additional consumer with a referral). The same property holds at the aggregate level. The total cost from giving referrals is equal to the (expected) referral fees collected,
where S = S(R (p; a; r)) = ln (1 R (p; a; r)) is the equilibrium referral intensity. In other words, the net bene…t to consumers from making referrals is zero. The comparative statics results of Proposition 1 imply that the equilibrium referral intensity S , reach R , and congestion '(R ) = S R are higher when referral cost, price, and advertising intensity are lower and the referral fee is higher. Intuitively, the factors that increase the bene…t of making referrals or reduce its cost must increase congestion for consumers to remain indi¤erent between referring and not. is higher than referral cost, m > c. The cost of advertising per consumer is described by function C(a), which is increasing at an increasing rate in the fraction of consumers reached, a, C 0 (a) > 0 and C 00 (a) > 0. To guarantee the interior solution in the presence of referrals, we would additionally assume that C 0 (0) < c and C(a) is su¢ ciently convex:
Let us …rst derive the …rm's pro…ts. The number of uninformed consumers who receive referrals is (1 a)R N , where R = R (p; a; r) is the referral reach, which is positive for high enough referral fees: r > r 0
and R = 0 otherwise. Then, the (per consumer) demand that the …rm faces is
where I = aN is the number of the informed consumers and U = (1 a)N is the number of uninformed consumers. Under an active referral policy, the …rm's (per consumer) pro…t is then
and it is 0 (p; a) = a (p) C(a) when there are no referrals, where (p) = p(1 G (p)).
We can rewrite the …rm's pro…t by using a property of the consumer referral equilibrium
Lemma 1. A …rm's pro…t in the consumer referral equilibrium under the …rm's policy vector
The pro…ts are equal to the revenue obtained from making a fraction A = a + (1 a) R of consumers aware about the product through advertisements and referrals, net of the cost of advertising to fraction a of consumers and sending S(R ) referrals. Importantly, the …rm's marginal cost of referrals equals the consumers'cost of making referrals.
We will next describe the optimal marketing mix of the …rm -its choice of price, advertising, and referral fee. When there are no referrals, the monopoly price is p m arg max p ( (p)). However, it is not clear if the optimal price p in the presence of consumer referrals is higher or lower than p m . On the one hand, referral fees raise the cost of selling the product for the …rm, and we would expect the …rm to have a higher price under referrals.
On the other hand, from Proposition 1 a higher price means lower referral incentives, and therefore the …rm may want to set a lower price to promote referrals. Perhaps surprisingly, we can give a de…nite answer to this question when the …rm optimally chooses both p and r . The two e¤ects cancel each other when the …rm is optimally choosing its price and referral fee, and consumer behavior is described by the referral equilibrium. Proposition 2 states that under referrals the …rm continues to set the standard monopoly price p m , irrespective of the level of advertising.
Proposition 2. The …rm sets the standard monopoly price p m when it supports consumer referrals with an optimally chosen referral fee.
To see why this proposition holds, consider the following three …rst-order conditions that characterize the pro…t-maximizing monopoly policy vector (p; a; r):
From the last condition, we …nd that, as long as referral reach is responsive to referral fee ( @R @r > 0, which occurs when r > r 0 ), the referral fee has to be set by the …rm to equalize the marginal bene…t of expanding referral reach and the marginal cost of doing sot:
This means that for an optimal referral fee, the marginal net bene…t of expanding referral reach is zero. Figure 1 illustrates the …rm's choice of referral reach R that equalizes the marginal bene…t of extending referral reach M B R = (1 a) (p) and its marginal cost, M C R = cS 0 (R) = c=(1 R). Although the …rm cannot directly control referral reach, it can set referral fee r in such a way as to achieve R through endogenous consumer referral decisions, which are based on the (average) cost and bene…t of making a referral in equilibrium, AB R = b = r(1 a)(1 G(p)) and AC R = c'(R).
[Figure 1 HERE]
We can use the observation that referral expansion has zero …rst-order e¤ects on pro…ts to further characterize the optimal choice of price and advertising. Using equation (12), the …rst-order conditions for p and a can be written as d dp
Active consumer referrals imply that a 2 (0; 1) and R > 0. This means that the pro…t-maximizing price satis…es 0 (p) = 0, and the …rm's pricing policy under active consumer referrals remains unchanged from the standard monopoly pricing, p = p m . As is easily understood from the above derivations, although p would a¤ect the referral reach R , the monopoly can always control R by adjusting referral fee r optimally. That is, if the …rm has the right policy tools, it can follow the standard monopoly pricing despite the fact that the price level a¤ects the equilibrium referral reach.
Next we turn to …rm's advertising strategy. For an optimally set referral fee, the …rm advertises less under referrals. This result follows from the comparison of …rst-order conditions under no referrals and under the optimal referral policy. Since we assume C 0 (a) > 0, C 00 (a) > 0, C 0 (0) < c, and m > c, there exists a unique unique interior pro…t-maximizing level of advertising under no referrals for p = p m : a = a (p) arg max fa (p) C(a)g 2 (0; 1). It is described by the …rst-order condition
, the marginal cost of advertising is the same, while the marginal bene…t of advertising, (1 R ) (p), is lower when the seller supports active consumer referrals because ads are wasted on consumers who become aware of the product through referrals. Hence, the …rm advertises less with an optimally set referral fee than when it does not support referrals, and the result does not depend on a price level.
The next proposition shows that the …rm advertises less even if the referral fee is set at an arbitrary level r 0 < r < p.
Proposition 3. The …rm advertises less when it supports consumer referrals than when it does not, and the result is true for any price and referral fee consistent with active referrals.
There are two reasons why the …rm would cut on advertising expenditures. First, less advertising means more uninformed consumers who can potentially become informed through referrals. Second, more uninformed consumers implies higher referral incentives and a higher proportion of consumers receiving referrals.
Lemma 2 describes the comparative statics responses of the optimal monopoly policy (p ; a ; r ) to changes in referral cost. From Proposition 2 we know that the optimal price does not change, but what happens to the referral fee and advertising?
Lemma 2. Under the optimal monopoly policy (p ; a ; r ) that supports consumer referrals, a higher referral cost results in a higher referral fee, more advertising, and lower referral reach.
The comparative statics for referral fee and reach continue to hold when advertising intensity and/or price are exogenously …xed at arbitrary levels consistent with consumer referrals.
Intuitively, the …rm o¤ers a higher referral fee to compensate consumers for a higher referral cost. On the other hand, when it is not costly for consumers to refer their contacts, more of them attempt to make referrals, which results in a higher level of congestion in referrals. The …rm responds to this by lowering incentives for referrals -it reduces the referral fee and increases its advertising level, leaving fewer consumers uninformed.
, we can describe the …rm's optimal choice of advertising intensity and referral fee (referral reach) as follows:
Note that the choices of a and R are interrelated. A higher level of advertising reduces the bene…t from referrals and vice versa. This suggests that the two information channels are substitutes. Indeed, as Lemma 2 shows, when the referral cost increases, the …rm supports fewer referrals and increases its reliance on advertising.
Proposition 4 provides a su¢ cient condition for the …rm to use active consumer referrals.
Proposition 4. The optimal monopoly policy (p ; a ; r ) supports consumer referrals if the referral cost is su¢ ciently small,
where
The result is intuitive. In the proof, we note that the condition on the referral cost can be written as
. From Proposition 2, a (p m ) > a , and therefore
. When this inequality holds, the …rm can set a referral fee slightly below the monopoly price to support active consumer referrals and earn more pro…ts from consumers to the …rm through referral.
We can also show that for any given a 2 (0; 1) and p > 0, the …rm supports consumer referrals if and only if c < (1 a) (p). This follows from the fact that the inequality is
, and therefore by Proposition 1, there exists referral fee r such that p > r > r 0 c (1 a)(1 G(p)) . This referral fee supports consumer referrals and allows the …rm to gain additional pro…ts from consumers coming by referral. The opposite is also true.
, then there does not exist r such that p > r > r 0 , and therefore the …rm cannot increase its pro…ts by the introduction of a referral program, keeping a and p …xed.
Welfare Considerations
Proposition 5 shows that allowing a …rm to support consumer referrals generally results in a Pareto improvement.
Proposition 5. The equilibrium allocation achieved under the optimal monopoly policy (p ; a ; r ) that supports consumer referrals Pareto-dominates the one achieved when the …rm cannot use consumer referrals.
Proof. The …rm cannot be worse o¤ if it chooses to support referrals. Consumer demand expands and the monopoly price is unchanged under referrals. Hence, both the …rm and consumers bene…t from the presence of consumer referrals.
Given that the price is unchanged and more consumers are aware of the product under referrals, there is no consumer who is worse o¤. It follows that if the …rm supports consumer referrals, it is socially optimal to do so.
To obtain further welfare results, we need to de…ne a few terms. Consumer awareness of the product, A(p; a; r) = a + (1 a) R (p; a; r), is the measure of consumers informed through advertising or consumer referrals. From this de…nition, R = Monopoly pro…ts are (p; a; r) = A(p; a; r) (p) C(a) cS(R (p; a; r)):
dv be the (gross) consumer surplus from buying the product.
Since the net bene…t to consumers from making referrals is zero, consumer welfare is CW = A(p; a; r) (CS(p) (p)). Consumers bene…t from higher product awareness and also prefer a lower price. We de…ne the social welfare as the sum of monopoly pro…ts and consumer welfare, W = + CW . The social welfare is then
Monopoly pro…ts can be written in terms of price, advertising, and awareness:
How does the …rm choose the awareness level? The …rst-order condition for awareness is
where we used
. The …rst-order condition just says that the marginal bene…t of raising awareness is equal to the e¤ective marginal cost (which is the cost of reaching a marginal consumer unaware of the product with a referral). That is, the pro…t-maximizing level of awareness is
For an optimally chosen referral fee, the consumer awareness A does not depend on the level of advertising when it is exogenous to the model. It depends only on the pro…tability of sales (p) and cost of referral c. By similar arguments, the socially optimal level of awareness is
and we conclude that the …rm underprovides product awareness, A < A SO .
[ Figure How does the …rm choose the advertising level? The …rst-order condition for advertising level a is
The …rm's choice of advertising under active referrals is guided by a simple cost analysis. The …rm chooses the level of advertising to minimize the cost of advertising and referral payments, C(a)+ cS(R (a; r; p))c, which is why it chooses the socially optimal level of advertising. This is true even if price is not set at the pro…t-maximizing level. . There exists a unique interior solution because we assume C 0 (0) < c and C(a) is su¢ ciently convex:
chosen referral fee, society would face the exact same trade-o¤s and choose the same level of advertising, a SO = a .
[ Figure 3 HERE]
Given that the monopoly underprovides product awareness and faces the social tradeo¤s in selection of its advertising level, it follows that the …rm supports fewer consumer referrals than is socially optimal, R < R SO . Proposition 6 summarizes the comparisons between socially optimal and pro…t-maximizing levels of advertising, referral reach, and product awareness.
Proposition 6. The monopoly policy that supports consumer referrals provides the socially optimal level of advertising but lower referral reach and awareness than is socially optimal.
Since the gains to society from higher product awareness are higher than the bene…t to the …rm, CS(p) > (p), the …rm underprovides product awareness. This is the standard result of non-appropriability of consumer surplus. The …rm chooses the socially optimal advertising level because the choice of advertising is motivated by arguments of e¢ ciency.
The …rm minimizes the cost of making consumers aware of the product using two information channels -advertising and consumer referrals. Therefore, the trade-o¤ that the …rm faces is the same as that under social-welfare maximization. As usual, the monopoly charges a price p = p m that is higher than the socially optimal price, and the regular social ine¢ ciency due to monopoly power occurs.
Better Informed Consumers
In the benchmark model, we assumed that consumers are no better informed than the monopoly about other consumers. Clearly, this may not be the case. Consumers may have superior knowledge regarding the values of other consumers and their product awareness.
This gives the …rm an additional incentive to rely on consumer referrals. In this section, we consider two simple extensions in this direction.
Single-type consumers
First, we consider how the results of the benchmark model change if (case 1) consumers know whether other consumers receive the …rm's advertisements and (case 2) consumers know other consumers'valuations of for the product (or know that the valuations are high enough for consumers to buy the product). The …rst scenario may arise when consumers are known to subscribe to the same media or be members of a forum, newsgroup, or distribution list. The second scenario could be due consumers'being informed about others'income or preferences. It is also possible for consumers to know both 1) and 2) (case 3).
In general, the results of the benchmark model extend in these cases. In each case, there exists a unique referral equilibrium in which consumers receive zero net bene…t from making referrals due to congestion in referral messages. Since referrals are not wasted on unlikely prospects, the …rm has an incentive to rely more on targeted referrals. This makes advertising less attractive because ads are wasted on consumers who obtain referrals. Therefore, the …rm has an incentive to reduce its level of advertising. The only di¤erence between pro…ts and social welfare is that the …rm derives bene…t (p) from a sale while the bene…t is CS (p) for the society as a whole. As in the benchmark case, the …rm underprovides referral reach and product awareness.
The results di¤er from the benchmark model for two reasons. First, when consumers are better informed, they target referrals to individuals who are more likely to buy the product.
This implies that the bene…t from each referral is higher. As a result, consumers choose to o¤er more referrals, and the level of congestion is higher in the referral equilibrium with better-informed consumers. This means that although referral messages are not wasted on unlikely prospects, because of the higher congestion level the savings are not fully captured by either consumers or the …rm. To reduce congestion, the monopoly sets the referral-fee-toprice ratio at a lower level when referrals are targeted than when they are random. Second, a decision variable may a¤ect the targetability of referrals. In cases 1 and 3, since the targetability of referrals can be improved by additional advertising, the comparison between the advertising level under random and targeted referrals is harder to make. The …rm would prefer less advertising because targeted referrals are cheaper, and it can save money by doing less advertising and more referrals. At the same time, advertising is bene…cial because it increases the targetability of referrals, making referrals even cheaper to use.
Proposition 7 summarizes our …ndings for targeted referrals for single-type consumers.
Proposition 7.
1). The monopoly supports more referrals and higher product awareness while o¤ering a lower referral fee to price ratio when referrals are targeted than when they are random, as in the benchmark model.
2). When consumers know whether other consumers are informed through advertising, the …rm's price is the same as in the benchmark model. It advertises less than in the case of no referrals.
3). When consumers know other consumers'valuations, the …rm's price is higher and there is less advertising than in the benchmark model. 4). When consumers know who is informed and who is willing to buy the product, the …rm's price is higher than in the benchmark model. The …rm advertises less than in the case of no referrals.
Consider …rst the case when consumers know whether other consumers are informed through advertising. In this case, the targetability of referrals is a¤ected by advertising but not by price. As a result, the …rm continues to charge the standard monopoly price. It advertise less than in the case of no referrals. The higher level of congestion in the referral equilibrium is combatted by a lower referral fee.
When consumers know other consumers'valuations for the product, they refer only those contacts whose valuations exceed the price of the product. The …rm's price is higher than the standard monopoly price because pricing does a¤ect the targetability of referrals: a higher price implies fewer consumers with su¢ ciently high valuations. Thus, there is an additional bene…t to a price increase: more precise targeting of referrals and a resulting cost savings because referrals are not wasted on consumers who are not going to buy the product by referral. Less advertising is sustained in this case than in the benchmark model because referrals are more targeted and therefore cheaper to use when raising product awareness. An additional reason for less advertising is that because of the price distortion, the pro…tability of a sale is lower.
In case 3, referrals are given only to people who are uninformed and willing to buy the product. In this case, both advertising and pricing a¤ect the targetability of referrals, and therefore the monopoly has an incentive to distort them relative to the benchmark model in the direction of increasing targetability of referrals. That is, price is set above the monopoly level. Although monopoly has an incentive to increase advertising to make consumer referrals more targeted, it continues to advertise less than in the case of no referrals.
Two types of consumers
We continue to assume that the monopoly knows the cumulative distribution function of consumer willingness-to-pay for the general population, G. The departure from the basic model is to assume that there are two groups of consumers: H and L with fractions
. We assume that consumers can tell which group other consumers belong to, while the …rm cannot distinguish these two groups of consumers.
Although consumers are better informed, the exact willingness-to-pay of each consumer is still that consumer's private information.
Group H (L) consumers tend to have higher (lower) willingness-to-pay in the sense of the …rst-order stochastic dominance: i.e., for all v, G
the cumulative distribution functions for groups H and L. The supports of the distribution functions overlap, so that some consumers who belong to group L have higher willingness-topay than some consumers in group H. The general distribution G(v) is a weighted average
We assume strict concavity of pro…t for each group: 2g (p) p g 0 (p) < 0 for all p and all 2 fH; Lg.
Consumer i who received the …rm's advertisement can choose q is de…ned implicitly by
for all r > r 0 c (1 a)(1 G (p)) , and the equilibrium referral intensity is higher when referral 
The total cost of giving referrals to consumers in group is equal to the (expected) referral fees,
Note that has no e¤ect in determining consumer referral intensity and reach in each group.
The (per consumer) monopoly pro…t in this environment is
where R = R (p; a; r) > 0 for r > r 0 and R = 0 otherwise.
Equation (26) is clearly a natural extension of Lemma 1, but there is an important di¤erence. Although S = ln 1 R is still completely determined only by R , the …rm can no longer control R H and R L independently by using a single referral fee r. Indeed, if
we look at the …rst-order condition with respect to r, we have
where (p) = p(1 G (p)). This formula is similar to equation (11), but (1 a) (p) cS 0 (R ) = 0 is not assured for either . Thus, we cannot use the technique we used in the benchmark model to simplify d dp
Of course, if the …rm can use a di¤erentiated referral fee system (r H and r L ), the optimal referral reach R H and R L can be set for each group, and (1 a) (p) cS 0 (R ) = 0.
However, it is unreasonable to assume that the …rm can set type-dependent referral fees because the whole point of this extension is to examine how the …rm may use consumer referrals to utilize consumer information. For this reason, calculating the optimal monopoly price under active referrals for both groups is no longer simple. There is no dichotomy in the …rm's decision problem: use p to maximize pro…t per consumer and use r to control R .
However, we can show that the …rm would choose to increase its price after the introduction of active consumer referrals when only group H gets consumer referrals (i.e., when r H 0 < r r L 0 ). In this case, r needs to control only R H , and we can apply the same technique as before.
We compare the optimal policies under random and targeted referrals, (p m ; r ; a ) and (p T ; a T ; r T ), respectively. We will assume the following su¢ cient condition for no referrals to be extended to type-L consumers under targeted referrals:
Then, under targeted referrals, the …rm's optimal policy (p T ; a T ; r T ) is such that group-L consumers receive no referrals, and the …rm advertises less under targeted referrals than under random referrals, a T < a .
Moreover, the optimal monopoly price is higher under targeted referrals than the standard monopoly price, p T > p m , if the hazard rates satisfy the following condition:
for all for all p 2 (0; 1). The equilibrium referral reach is higher while the ratio of referral fee to product price is lower under targeted referrals than under random referrals, R T > R and r T =p T < r =p m .
The above hazard rate condition is a natural assumption. It means that the standard monopoly price for H-type consumers is higher than that for all consumers. Thus, in the case of targeted referrals, we no longer have the standard monopoly price. Notice, however, that as the proof of Proposition 8 shows, the optimal price is still the monopoly price given the set of consumers who get information through advertisements and referrals.
Proposition 8 shows that if consumers possess superior information about who would be likely to purchase the product, then the …rm would reduce its reliance on mass advertising and shift to using more consumer referrals. Interestingly, consumers can be better o¤ or worse o¤ by the …rm's use of referrals when consumers have information advantage. Under no referrals, every consumer has an equal probability of receiving information about the product. However, with targeted referrals, consumers who belong to a low willingness-topay type are less likely to receive the information, although some of them may have high valuations of the product. Thus, the impact of targeted referrals on consumers may depend on consumer type.
Conclusion
Several information channels are available to sellers who market their products to consumers.
These include traditional mass advertising on TV and in newspapers, targeted promotional advertising, "buzz" marketing, consumer word of mouth, and consumer referral policies. We look at the optimal marketing mix between advertising, referral policy, and price promotions, and discuss the welfare impact of referrals.
We …nd conditions for monopoly to support active referrals and characterize the equilibrium. Not surprisingly, the …rm's advertising intensity is reduced when consumer referrals are introduced. Perhaps surprisingly, we …nd that the pro…t-maximizing price is the standard monopoly price as long as the referral fee is chosen optimally. Intuitively, monopoly does not change its price in an attempt to manage consumer referrals but instead uses a referral fee.
We also show that the …rm's advertisement level is the same as the social optimum level, while the pro…t-maximizing referral reach and product awareness are lower than the socially optimal levels. Although our benchmark model provides multiple interesting results, the model lacks an important aspect of consumer referrals. One of the major motivations for a …rm to adopt a consumer referral program is the consumer information advantage: consumers may have better information than the …rm about other consumers'valuations. We show that if consumer referrals can be targeted, then it could be even more bene…cial for the …rm to use consumers to disseminate information about the product.
Appendix: Proofs Proposition 1. Proof. Consider the informed consumers' equilibrium choice of referral intensity q. There are n = (1 G (p))aN > 0 referrers (informed consumers who purchase the product) and U = (1 a)N > 0 uninformed consumers, where n is large. Referral attempts are made randomly. With probability 1 a referral attempts reach the uninformed consumers. We assume that if a consumer receives k referral attempts, then she chooses one with equal probability 1=k. Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, suppose that n 1 referrers are choosing referral intensity q, while the remaining referrer i chooses q i . Then, the proportion of the uninformed consumers who use referrals from i is
where C(n 1; k) = (n 1)!=(n 1 k)!k!. Note that the term (1 q)
denotes the probability that an uninformed consumer receives k referral attempts from other n 1 referrers. By rearranging the formula, we obtain
for q > 0, and F i (q i ; 0) = q i for q = 0. Referrer i's optimal referral choice q i is obtained by
for q 2 (0; 1] and
for q = 0, where the term 1 G (p) denotes the probability that an uninformed consumer purchases the product and cN q i denotes the cost of referring a fraction q i of all consumers.
Since U = (1 a)N , we obtain
for q = 0.
and n 2. and q 2 (0; 1], the unique best response is q i = 0. Thus, in this case, q 2 (0; 1] cannot be the equilibrium referral intensity in a symmetric equilibrium, and the only symmetric equilibrium is q = 0.
In a symmetric interior equilibrium, consumers are indi¤erent among all q i s. The symmetric equilibrium q is implicitly calculated as a unique solution to 10 We can show by induction that (1 q) n > 1 nq for q 2 (0; 1] and n 2. When n = 2, (1 q) 2 = 1 2q+ q 2 > 1 2q, and the result is true for n = 2. Suppose it is true for some n, i.e. (1 q) n > 1 nq. We need to show that it is then true for n + 1, i.e. (1 q) n+1 > 1 (n + 1) q. Note that (1 q) n+1 = (1 q)(1 q) n > (1 q)(1 nq) by the inductive hypothesis, and therefore (1 q) n+1 > 1 (n + 1) q + nq 2 > 1 (n + 1) q.
where c > 0, a > 0, p 0, and r 0. We used the approximation 1 (1 q ) n ' 1 e nq for small q because log(1 q) n = n log(1 q) ' nq, and (1 q) n ' e nq for small q.
The only candidate for the symmetric equilibrium intensity is S = nq that solves
. Since'(S ) 1, this equation has a solution only if r > c (1 a)(1 G(p)) . Then, indeed, given that others are choosing q , consumer i obtains a zero payo¤ for any strategy, and she might as well choose q . Thus, q is the symmetric referral equilibrium and S > 0 is the equilibrium referral intensity when r > c (1 a)(1 G(p)) . The equilibrium referral intensity S is unique when it exists because'(S ) is a strictly increasing function,' 0 (S ) > 0. In equilibrium it equals
, which is increasing in r and decreasing in a, p, and c. Hence, the equilibrium referral intensity, S = S (p; a; r) = nq , is increasing in r and decreasing in a, p, and c:
@S @p
< 0, and
. The equilibrium referral reach is R = R (S ) = 1 e S . Since it is an increasing function of S , the comparative statics results for R are the same as those for S .
Proposition 3. Proof. Without referrals, the monopoly pro…t is 0 (p; a) = (p) a C(a), and the marginal pro…t with respect to the level of advertising a is
Assuming C 0 (0) < (p), C 0 (a) > 0 and C 00 (a) > 0, there exists a unique pro…t-maximizing level of advertising under no referrals: a = C 0 1 ( (p)).
With referrals, the monopoly pro…t is
and the marginal pro…t from advertising is
For p > r, the second term is negative since R > 0 and by Proposition 1 @R @a < 0 under consumer referrals. Hence, the monopoly would advertise less when it supports referrals, a < a, and the result holds for any p and r consistent with active referrals (a su¢ cient condition for that is p > r > c (1 a)(1 G(p)) ).
The second-order su¢ cient condition for a given any p and r is
It is satis…ed for a su¢ ciently convex cost of advertising C(a), but it is harder to satisfy than in the case of no referrals since the second term is positive. We can see that by totally di¤erentiating (1 a)(1 G (p))r = c'(R ) with respect to a, we obtain (1 G (p))r = c'
@R @a
, and therefore sign( 
For an optimally chosen referral fee, the second-order su¢ cient condition for a is satis…ed if C 00 (a) > c (1 a) 2 , and an additional assumption 0 < C 0 (0) < c guarantees the existence of a unique interior a .
Lemma 2. Proof. From the …rst-order condition for referral fee r , the equilibrium referral reach is
and R > 0 because p > r > r 0
when the …rm supports active consumer referrals. Since S = ln(1 R ), it follows that S = ln
From Proposition 1, in the referral equilibrium,
Rewriting this expression using R and S for an optimally chosen r , we obtain
To see that r = r (p; a; c) is an increasing function of c and a, let x
, and
is a strictly decreasing function of x because @ @x
Hence, when advertising intensity is …xed, r is increasing in c.
Next, assume that the …rm could adjust advertising in response to changes in referral fees.
The optimal a and r are such that (p) (1 R ) C 0 (a) = 0 and (p) (1 R ) (1 a ) = c.
Hence, (1 a ) C 0 (a ) = c. Totally di¤erentiating this identity with respect to c, we obtain
. It follows that @a @c > 0 because C(a) is assumed to be su¢ ciently convex to satisfy the second-order condition:
We can now evaluate the total e¤ect of a change in referral cost on referral fees. Since
, the price is independent of c, and
we …nd that sign dr dc = sign C 00 (a ) @a @c
. To conclude, we …nd that the optimal referral fee is increasing in the referral cost, In all cases, the bene…t to consumers from making referrals is equal to the cost of referrals.
This can be written as 
In all cases, the optimal choice of r > r 0 is such that the marginal bene…t to the …rm of extending referral reach is equal to its marginal cost, and therefore: Note that ln x is a strictly concave function with ln(1) = 0 and (ln x) 0 = 1 at x = 1.
Thus, ln(x) < x 1 for all x 6 = 1. This implies ln(1 R) < R, and for all R 2 (0; 1)
we have f 0 (R) < 
Using (44), we can write the …rst-order conditions for advertising as:
no referrals:
First, consider pricing. Conditional on the optimal choice of r T , the …rst-order condition for price is d dp r=r Second, we consider advertising. Under the optimally chosen r T , the derivative of the pro…t with respect to a can be written as:
In the benchmark model of random referrals, the pro…t-maximizing level of advertising a (conditional on the optimal choice of r ) is described by
This means that the …rm has lower incentives for advertising under targeted referrals, and a T < a , since d da r=r T < 0 holds under p = p T and a = a > 0 by: 
